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Abstract:  
We introduce the idea that easily inferable demographic characteristics such as gender may not 
be sufficient to define type in the supervisor-employee mentoring relationship. We use 
longitudinal data on athletic directors at NCAA Division I programs to identify through observed 
mobility the propensity of top-level administrators to hire and retain female head coaches, above 
and beyond an organization’s culture. We show that supervisor gender appears to be unrelated to 
female friendliness in this setting. Overall, our findings indicate that more focus should be placed 
on the more complex manager type defined by attitudes in addition to attributes. 
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Article:  
Greater representation of females at top levels of a firm has been found to have positive effects 
on female workers’ career outcomes (e.g., Matsa and Miller 2011; Bell et al. 2008). A similar 
relationship has been established in other settings, such as higher education (e.g., Neumark and 
Gardecki 1998; Bettinger and Long 2005). When workers and supervisors are similar along an 
easily observable dimension, such as gender, mentoring may be more effective (Athey, Avery, 
and Zemsky 2000), or supervisors may be better at inferring employees’ unobserved qualities 
(Cornell and Welch 1996). Others, such as Rothstein (1997), have documented that females often 
earn higher wages when working under a male supervisor, but in the absence of detailed 
employer-level information it is not possible to rule out the explanation that supervisor gender is 
acting as a proxy for job type. Furthermore, the term “Queen bee syndrome,” which originates in 
the academic literature in the 1970s (Staines, Tavris, and Jayaratne 1974), has been used to 
describe women who have reached the top ranks of their company, particularly in a male-
dominated occupation, and intentionally hinder the career progress of females in lower levels of 
the job ladder. 
Rather than attempting to reconcile these seemingly conflicting ideas, in this paper we introduce 
the idea that easily inferable demographic characteristics may not be sufficient to define “type” 
in the supervisor-employee relationship, so that focusing on gender alone leaves out much of 
what drives the unexplained gender differences in career success. Our approach relies on 
following both upper- and lower-level workers in a multiple-establishment panel, which allows 
us to identify through observed mobility the propensity of supervisors to hire and retain female 
employees, above and beyond the organization’s culture. We then proceed to show that 
supervisor gender appears to be unrelated to this propensity. Our findings underscore the 
importance of understanding supervisors’ attitudes in addition to their attributes; studies that 
focus only on gender (or another demographic characteristic such as race) fail to account for 
important components of the mentoring relationship, and more focus should be placed on the 
more complex manager type that goes beyond gender. 
I. Data and Methodology 
It is likely that the role which institutional culture plays for the share and success of female 
workers is nonnegligible, regardless of the labor market setting under consideration. We 
construct a matched athletic director-university panel dataset for members of the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) who participate in Division I athletics. The panel spans 
the period from the 1993–1994 academic year to the 2010–2011 academic year. The main 
advantage of these data is that they follow supervisors across establishments so any institution-
specific time-invariant factors can be differenced out to identify the separate influence of athletic 
directors. Additionally, the hierarchical structure is consistent across institutions, and the athletic 
director position is associated with similar functions. The structure of our data is similar to 
Bertrand and Schoar’s (2003) matched manager-firm data with the additional information on 
gender composition in lower levels of the job ladder. Namely, we use information on the gender 
of the head coach for four women’s sports: basketball, soccer, softball, and volleyball. These 
sports are among the most widely represented in NCAA Division I athletics, with almost all 
programs having a participating team, and the gender distribution of head coaches is fairly 
balanced.1 The gender of each athletic director and the position start and end dates were 
identified through web searches. Head coach names are publicly available on the NCAA website 
(National Collegiate Athletic Association 1993–2011), and we identified gender through web 
searches for the names that were ambiguous. 
In order to separately identify institution-level fixed effects, we restrict the sample to schools for 
which at least one of the athletic directors is observed at multiple programs over the course of the 
sample period. For this subset of schools we use data for all years in which the school 
participated in Division I athletics with at least one team among the four sports we consider. 
Observations for which athletic director tenure is equal to zero are excluded from the estimation. 
Since it is possible that coaching staff adjustments require time, this restriction allows us to use 
data that are less likely to reflect the previous director’s choices. The estimation sample is an 
unbalanced 18-year panel for 200 schools that consists of 3,135 observations. There are 485 
unique athletic directors, of which 433 occupy the same position for more than two consecutive 
years (of these, 42 are female). Athletic directors who are observed in a program for fewer than 
two years are likely to be interim and as such may have comparatively less decision power. 
There are 137 administrators who are observed in the top position at multiple schools for more 
than two years in each school (of these, 9 are female). 
Female representation among Division I athletic directors has been increasing, although this 
effect is concentrated at schools that do not have a football team. The fraction of female athletic 
directors fluctuates only slightly over time at around 7.5 percent for the schools with a football 
team, and increases dramatically from 0 in 1995–1996 to 19 percent in the 2010–2011 school 
year for programs without a football team. The female share of coaches starts out at 65 percent 
and decreases by about 10 percentage points for programs with a football team and remains 
constant at around 46 percent for programs without a football team. The difference in the trends 
motivates the need for both university and time trends in the empirical analysis. 
Our measure of “female-friendliness” of athletic directors is based on directors’ heterogeneity in 
the propensity to hire and retain female coaches beyond any time-invariant school-specific 
factors. The identification relies on athletic directors observed at multiple programs. We estimate 
a model of the fraction of females coaching the teams included in our data at school j in 
academic year t under athletic director i : 
(1) pct_femaleijt = γ j + η t + δ i + ε ijt . 
School and year fixed effects account for differences across institutions and over time in the 
gender composition of coaching staffs. The variable δ i is an athletic director fixed effect 
estimated for administrators who are observed holding this position for more than two full 
seasons during the sample period. It must, however, be pointed out that athletic directors are 
clearly not randomly assigned to schools, so we are not necessarily identifying a causal effect. 
Our approach is to pick up systematic differences in the share of female head coaches across 
programs and over time that we can link to individual athletic directors. 
A more conservative approach limits the set of estimated fixed effects to athletic directors who 
are observed at multiple programs. This allows us to separate the influence of individual 
administrators from unrelated institution-specific time trends concurrent with their tenure. Since 
this considerably narrows down the group of athletic directors with estimated fixed effects to 128 
males and 9 females, we report both sets of results. We also estimate equation (1) with no 
director fixed effects in order to show the explanatory power of the δ i parameters. Similar to the 
analysis in Bertrand and Schoar (2003), we compare the adjusted R 2 of the regressions that do 
and do not include director fixed effects and report the F-statistic for the joint significance test of 
all δ s. We interpret the results as evidence of the importance of athletic director heterogeneity 
for the gender composition of head coaches above and beyond a school-specific average. 
Table 1. Importance of Athletic Director Heterogeneity 
Adjusted R2  0.49  0.56  0.72 
F-statistic  —  4.52  7.08 
AD fixed effects  No  Movers  All noninterim 
Number of FEs  —  137  433 
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of females among head coaches for softball and 
women’s basketball, soccer, and volleyball. All specifications include year and school indicators. 
Athletic directors who spent more than two full seasons in the same position are defined as 
noninterim. Observations with director tenure of 0 are excluded. The estimation sample consists 
of 3,135 school-year observations. 
II. Findings 
The estimation results for the model in equation (1) are summarized in Table 1, with column 1 
showing the baseline specification with no athletic director fixed effects, column 2 showing 
results with the more restricted set of fixed effects for directors who moved across programs 
while in the sample, and estimates based on the broader set of fixed effects in column 3. The 
estimates show evidence of nonnegligible athletic director effects. The adjusted R2 increases 
from 0.49 to 0.56 after the smaller set of fixed effects is included, and the F-statistic for the set of 
137 binary variables is 4.52, allowing us to reject the null hypothesis that all parameters equal 
zero at a very high confidence level. Including fixed effects for all noninterim athletic directors 
increases the adjusted R2 to 0.72 and the F-statistic for the 433 binary variables is 7.08. Based on 
the results in Table 1, we can conclude that athletic director heterogeneity matters in a 
statistically and economically significant way for the gender composition of head coaches, and a 
comparison of directors’ propensity to hire and retain females is meaningful. 
We next proceed to examine in more detail the distribution of the estimated fixed effects by 
athletic director gender. The distribution of the two sets of δ  estimates is shown in Figure 1.2 
The most and the least female-friendly administrators tend to be male, and there are no 
discernible gender differences in the distributions. The null hypothesis that the δ s for males 
and females are drawn from the same distribution cannot be rejected by a Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test ( p-value of 0.5 for the smaller sample and 0.8 for the larger sample of athletic directors). To 
further test for statistically significant differences, we regress the estimated parameters on a 
gender indicator and a constant term. Table 2 shows results from an OLS specification (column 
1) and quantile regressions at the twenty-fifth, fiftieth, and seventy-fifth percentiles (columns 2– 
4). We weight each observation by the inverse of the OLS variance of the fixed effect estimate so 
that greater weight is placed on more precisely estimated observations. Panel A of Table 2 shows 
results for the directors who are observed at multiple programs, while the larger set of fixed 
effects is used to obtain the estimates in panel B. The gender coefficients are not statistically 
significant in any of the specifications. The R2 of the OLS regression in column 1 is low: 0.0016 
in panel A and below 0.0001 in panel B of Table 2. The sample of female athletic directors 
included in the models in panel A is very limited, but the combined results in panels A and B do 
not support the claim that supervisor gender and “female-friendliness,” defined as having a high 
value of δ , are related in our data. 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of Athletic Director Fixed Effects by Gender 
Table 2. Distribution of the Estimated Athletic Director Fixed Effects 
 OLS  Twenty-fifth 
percentile  
Fiftieth 
percentile  
Seventy-fifth 
percentile 
Panel A. Mean and quantile regressions of δ − movers (N = 137)  
Female 
AD  
0.0287 
(0.0625)  
0.0703  
(0.1016) 
0.0522 
(0.0802)  
−0.0323 
(0.0923) 
Constant  −0.0036 
(0.0145) 
−0.0943***  
(0.0235) 
−0.0018 
(0.0186)  
0.1176*** 
(0.0214) 
R2  0.0016  
Panel B. Mean and quantile regressions of δ − all noninterims (N = 433)  
Female 
AD  
0.0025  
(0.0505) 
0.0166 
(0.0626)  
−0.0586 
(0.0583)  
0.0691 
(0.0692) 
Constant  0.0190 
(0.0148)  
−0.1651*** 
(0.0184)  
0.0270  
(0.0171) 
0.2076*** 
(0.0203) 
R2  0.0000  
Note: The inverses of the fixed effect estimation variances are used as weights. *** Significant at 
the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Finally, to provide some external validity of the measure of female-friendliness, we use data on 
team revenues and expenditures reported by Division I institutions in accordance with the Equity 
in Athletics Disclosure Act (EADA).We use data on total team expenses and revenues for the 
period 2002–2003 to 2010–2011 (Office of Postsecondary Education 2002–2011). As stated on 
the EADA survey form, the expenses category “includes appearance guarantees and options, 
athletically related student aid, contract services, equipment, fundraising activities, operating 
expenses, promotional activities, recruiting expenses, salaries and benefits, supplies, travel, and 
any other expenses attributable to intercollegiate athletic activities.” For each team included in 
the EADA database, we construct the ratio of expenses to revenues; if a sport is played by both 
men and women, the ratio is calculated separately by gender. Both expenses and revenues are 
taken into account in order to track whether administrators provide additional support in terms of 
expenditures when revenues increase or cut resources disproportionately when revenues fall. We 
regress this measure on the fixed effects estimated from (1),3 as well as director gender, year and 
team (school-by-sport) indicators. We again use the inverses of the fixed effect estimation 
variances as weights. Separate models are estimated for men’s and for women’s sports. 
The results in Table 3 imply that spending on women’s sports relative to team revenues is higher 
when the athletic director is more female-friendly, while the effect on men’s sports is ambiguous. 
The results are stronger with the more conservative set of fixed effects. The specifications that 
focus on administrators observed at multiple programs are less likely to pick up unrelated time-
varying institution trends that coincide with a director’s tenure. We interpret the results as 
evidence that the supervisor type we introduce is not narrowly defined to matter only for the 
fraction of female coaches at an institution; it appears to be correlated with other female-friendly 
practices. The coefficient on the indicator for female is negative for both men’s and women’s 
teams but larger in absolute value and statistically significant in the latter case. 
Table 3. Female-Friendly Athletic Directors’ Support for Women’s Sports: EADA Data, 2002–
2003 to 2010–2011 
 All noninterim Movers 
 Women’s sports Men’s sports Women’s sports Men’s sports 
δ (adjusted) 0.4253* 0.1982 1.4486*** −0.5609 
(0.2232) (0.2058) (0.5323) (0.5327) 
Female AD −0.4224*** 
(0.0860) 
−0.0868 
(0.0806) 
−0.5986** 
(0.2711) 
−0.3434 
(0.2347) 
Observations 11,079 10,405 5,806 5,544 
R2 0.6655 0.6686 0.7214 0.7109 
Number of 
schools 
198 198 151 153 
Notes: The dependent variable in each regression is the ratio of expenses to revenues for a given 
team. All specifications include year and team fixed effects. The inverses of the fixed effect 
estimation variances are used as weights. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at 
the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
III. Conclusion 
Previous research has established that individuals at top levels of the firm have strong potential 
to affect overall performance and turnover. There is a growing body of literature that explores 
the mechanisms through which leaders matter. In many cases high-level managers make 
personnel decisions or interact with mid-level managers, possibly in a mentorship role. Managers 
may be better able to detect the true ability of a subordinate if they share a characteristic, such as 
gender. Worker-manager type matches may make the role of mentorship more effective or 
alternatively, there may be discrimination against members of the firm who do not share the 
same characteristic as the top manager. We extend this literature by allowing supervisors’ 
attitudes in addition to their attributes to drive the level of support for female mid-level 
managers, which places additional burdens on the data in order to identify the distribution of 
female-friendliness. We find evidence in our sample of NCAA Division I athletic directors of 
heterogeneity in the propensity to hire and retain females, which is identified separately from 
institution-specific factors through observed mobility. We do not find evidence that gender is 
strongly predictive of a supervisor’s female-friendliness. The relationships we document in this 
specific labor market may not be immediately generalizable to broader labor market settings, but 
the conclusions we draw are novel and should motivate researchers to go beyond easily 
observable supervisor characteristics and to explore further the role of less obvious definitions of 
type in the mentoring relationship. 
Notes 
1 See for example the 2005–06 NCAA Gender-Equity Report. The fraction of female coaches 
ranges from about one-third for soccer to over two-thirds for softball. 
2 For the 137 individuals for whom we estimate two fixed effects, the correlation in the two sets 
of estimated parameters is 0.53. 
3 The estimates are first adjusted to account for the additional estimation variance. The 
adjustment is based on Bayesian shrinkage (Morris 1983) and is similar to the approach taken by 
studies of teacher or principal effectiveness (e.g., Jacob and Lefgren 2008; Branch, Hanushek, 
and Rivkin 2012). When multiple athletic directors are present at a school during a given season, 
we use the average fixed effect value. 
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